British Liberators in the Age of Napoleon by Iglesias Rogers Graciela;

Author:Iglesias Rogers, Graciela;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

Conclusion

On the strength of this work, it seems now justified to assert that there was significant – and hitherto unrecognized – British involvement in the Peninsular war beyond the ambit of the military operations exclusively sanctioned by the British government. Spanish resistance to Napoleon galvanized British public opinion to a degree perhaps not fully appreciated until now, leading men from widely different backgrounds to go in aid of a community that, as a political entity, had been hostile to their country of birth, and of which the majority knew almost nothing. What they found was bewildering: an embattled society trying to come to terms with a sudden vacuum of legitimate authority and also one determined not to succumb to the diktat of a French world order. The British volunteers’ desire to help Spaniards to preserve their liberty fitted well within the scope of the ‘Spanish cause’, a term that had at its core the defence of Spanish freedom from foreign intervention along with multiple, often contrasting, subsidiary meanings, such as the attainment of substantial political reforms and the exertion of revenge on the enemy. Top of the list of priorities was the restoration of Ferdinand VII to the throne and the recovery and preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Monarquía Hispana. At times, tensions and disagreements within Patriot ranks gave all the appearance that the conflict could turn into a civil war. But this did not happen. Internal dissent was debilitating and caused much frustration, but never managed to completely quash Spanish insurgency against the French. The volunteers’ trust in the will and capability of common Spaniards – as opposed to that of many of their leaders – proved to be well placed. No other nation in Europe resisted French invasion so consistently, for so long. While they were conscious of that danger – and yes, there were times when a reminder from their British friends was called for – Spaniards somehow knew when to step back from the brink.

Between 200,000 and 310,000 French troops, that is to say three-fifths of the Empire’s total armed strength (and almost four times the force that Napoleon originally had designated for this duty) were tied down in Spain over a period of 6 years, draining as a result the French Treasury. Napoleon only withdrew 27,000 troops for the Russian campaign. Over 50,000 died in battle, killed by the guerrilla or by illnesses partly caused by the awful conditions in which they had to subsist.1 The regular versus irregular fighters’ dichotomy and other historiographical debates that revolve around arguments that pit British involvement against Spanish dogged tenacity are not useful in explaining such outcome. This is because, ultimately, victory arose from the fusion of all these elements. Whitehall’s approach to the conflict could fluctuate from inertia to direct intervention; yet all its policies were predicated on establishing an Iberian base from which to launch an offensive against Napoleon’s Empire or, at worst, contain its advance. The latter prompted the consideration of abandoning Spain to Napoleon at least once, in 1810.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.